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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we present an overview of how the 
International Space Station (ISS) safety engineering 
methodology directed to controlling extravehicular 
activity (EVA) crew electrical shock hazards, caused by 
ISS spacecraft charging, has evolved over the past 25+ 
years.  Long-term measurements of ISS charging 
severity and frequency-of-occurrence, combined with 
detailed probabilistic analysis of EVA electric shock-
circuit completion, led to a change in hazard control 
methodology.  The requirement for two-fault tolerant 
EVA shock hazard control during all EVAs was 
replaced with a less operationally burdensome and risky 
EVA shock hazard detection and warning process.  The 
applicability of event probability-based detection-and-
warning processes to human spaceflight charging hazard 
control beyond low-earth orbit (LEO) is also 
considered.    
 
1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
ISS floating potential probe (FPP) and ISS plasma 
contactor unit (PCU) emission current measurements 
made during the years 2000 and 2001 demonstrated that 
the severity and duration of ISS charging events were 
far less than predicted by worst-case pre-flight estimates 
[1-4], though considerable uncertainty remained about 
how the hazard environment might change as ISS 
assembly continued.   
 
Spacecraft-charging-driven dielectric breakdown arcing 
of external thin dielectric surfaces was recognized early 
on as the specific event causing possible hazardous 
outcomes affecting avionics, touch temperature of 
surfaces subject to EVA crew contact, and EVA crew 
electric shock.    However, by the end of 2002, avionics 
effects were shown to be negligible and only the EVA 
hazards were still subject to active control by the ISS 
program. Both positive and negative ISS Floating 
Potential (FP) values can be EVA shock hazard causes 
[5,10].  Negative FP values may cause dielectric 
breakdown of exposed thin anodic films on the 
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) completing a 
potentially hazardous circuit through the EMU suited 
crew person. This is achieved by dielectric breakdown 
arc plasma discharging charged dielectric surfaces 
overlying negatively charged conducting structure [5].  
Positive FP values cause collection of electron current 
by exposed conducting surfaces on the EMU suit and 
associated EVA tools.  The collected current can then 
flow through the EVA crew person to the positively 
biased ISS structure. The subject hazards become 
possible only when electrically conducting EMU 
components contact ISS conducting structure, and 
charge is passed across the EVA crew person’s body 
(specifically, the heart and voluntary muscle spasms). 
   
To reduce the uncertainty in estimates of ISS charging 
severity as ISS construction continued, the ISS program 
installed a Floating Potential Measurement Unit 
(FPMU) on ISS during 2006 to quantify hazard severity 
and frequency of occurrence [6].  The FPMU measures 
both ISS floating potential (FP), defined as ISS 
conducting structure voltage measured relative to the 
surrounding ionospheric plasma, as well as ionospheric 
electron temperature (Te) and density (Ne), the most 
important natural environmental parameters in ISS 
charging models.  FPMU data were validated against 
comparable ground-based and satellite measurements of 
Ne and Te [5,6].  FPMU measurement campaigns are 
ongoing as a key part of the EVA shock hazard 
detection and warning process.   
 
Between 2006 and 2014, thousands of FPMU 
measurements demonstrated that hazardous ISS 
charging environments occur only infrequently, but not 
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infrequently enough to ignore, largely because 
extremely low solar activity led to observed ionospheric 
densities that were too low to cause hazardous charging.  
Historically low solar activity during the deep solar 
minimum following solar cycle 23, continuing, through 
the weak maximum of solar cycle 24, and expected to 
continue through solar cycle 25 contributed to that 
outcome [7, 8].  However, unanticipated increases in 
solar activity, or specific space weather events, e.g. 
coronal mass ejections and associated geomagnetic 
storms, can lead to increased ionospheric densities that 
are potentially hazardous. The ISS spacecraft charging 
detection and warning process identifies possibly 
hazardous conditions before they occur and advises ISS 
management in time to activate EVA shock hazard 
controls as needed [5].  
 
Motional electromagnetic force (motional EMF, aka 
magnetic induction) also contributes to ISS FP via high-
speed flight through the earth’s geomagnetic field.  The 
magnitude of the effect depends on the orientation of 
the ISS structure with respect to the velocity vector and 
the geomagnetic field lines, and maximum FP voltages 
occur at high latitude when ISS is operating in the 
nominal flight attitude, where the 100-meter truss is 
perpendicular to the velocity vector. Small positive FP 
voltages (~+10V) are generated at one truss tip and 
larger negative FP voltages (~-40 V) are generated at 
the other [5]. 
 
Operation of payloads or system equipment that either 
collect or emit charged particles from ISS, such as 
experimental electric propulsion systems as well as 
photovoltaic or thermoelectric arrays with exposed 
metallic circuit elements, can also affect ISS FP. 
Devices emitting charged particle beams, without 
neutralization, can drive ISS FP to unacceptable values. 
 
When operating, the ISS plasma contactor units (PCUs) 
emit current as needed to control ISS FP [1-6].  ISS 
carries two active PCUs enabling single-fault-tolerant 
ISS floating potential control.  However, ISS safety 
requirements mandate two-fault-tolerant hazard controls 
for catastrophic hazards.  Somewhat risky and 
burdensome ISS vehicle operational hazard controls 
provide the third hazard control when needed.  
 
Replacing a hazard control process requiring two-fault-
tolerant hazard controls for all EVAs with a detection 
and warning process is possible if and only if it can be 
demonstrated that, through a combination of in-flight 
measurements, ground based testing, and probabilistic 
analysis, the following criteria are true: 
 
1) The probability (P1) of hazardous FP values (both 
positive and negative) on ISS is nominally low. 
2) Space weather events and/or vehicle configuration 
changes leading to hazardous FP values on ISS can 
be identified with sufficient lead-time to enable 
activation of controls or rescheduling of the EVA. 
In addition, the expected frequency of occurrence 
of hazard control activation or rescheduling of 
EVAs must be acceptably small. 
3) The probability (P2) of completing the EVA crew-
hazard shock-circuit during any EVA is low. 
4) The net probability of an EVA crew shock event, 
Ps, as a function of P1 and P2, is small enough for 
the ISS Program to accept the residual risk when 
EVA is conducted without any active hazard 
controls.  
 
In the following sections of this paper, we present the 
analysis and supporting data demonstrating that 
statements 1-4 above are true.   Note that in the hazard 
analysis presented below we treat P1 and P2 as 
independent random variables.  P1 is very low and 
supports a detection-and-warning risk acceptance 
process instead of hazard controls because of unusually 
low solar activity during the past two decades, driving 
unusually low ionospheric densities at ISS operating 
altitudes.  If solar activity, and hence ionospheric 
densities, were more typical of those observed during 
the 20th century, the detection and warning process 
would likely not be acceptable.  It should also be noted 
that nominal ISS operations very seldom place the high 
voltage PV array wings in a configuration that 
maximized electron collection. 
 
In this paper, we address only EVA electric shock 
hazards caused by ISS spacecraft charging processes.  
We do not address the more conventional electric shock 
hazards resulting from EVA galvanic contact with 
electrical power system conductors carrying voltage and 
current. 
 
ISS spacecraft charging environments and physical 
mechanisms are radically different from those 
encountered at higher altitudes in Earth’s 
magnetosphere and in cis-lunar and interplanetary 
space.  ISS charging is driven by voltages generated by 
ISS itself, specifically the operation of the photovoltaic 
power system in sunlight and/or the motional EMF 
resulting from high-speed flight of ISS conducting 
structure through the geomagnetic field [5].  The 
internally generated voltages drive collection of ions 
and electrons from the relatively low-temperature, high-
density ionospheric plasma that is ever-present at ISS 
operating altitudes [9].  Collection of ions and electrons 
(current collection) generates the ISS FP [1-5].  The 
magnitude of the FP determines the voltage drop across 
exposed dielectric material, as well as current collection 
by exposed conductors, determining the character of ISS 
spacecraft charging hazards [10].     
  
 
The much-reduced strength of the geomagnetic field at 
higher altitudes and in cis-lunar space, combined with 
the absence of a natural ionosphere makes ISS-like 
charging mechanisms largely negligible [11]. Energetic 
charged particles (primarily energetic electrons), 
sunlight/photoemission, and secondary electron 
emission are the most important natural factors affecting 
spacecraft charging in magentospheric and cis-lunar 
environments beyond LEO [12]. However, spacecraft 
utilizing electric propulsion systems generate a local 
artificial ionosphere and current collection from that 
artificial ionosphere may lead to ISS-like spacecraft 
charging processes [5]. 
  
2. CRITERIA 1: THE PROBABILITY (P1) OF 
HAZARDOUS FP VALUES ON ISS IS SMALL 
(ESTIMATING P1) 
The ISS Space Environments team performs an annual 
review of ISS FPMU FP measurements for possible 
exceedances of the negative and positive FP potential 
thresholds that were determined during the ISS EVA 
safety process. 
 
The negative ISS FP EVA safety threshold (-45V) was 
established early in the ISS Program based on 
laboratory testing performed at NASA MSFC, with an 
additional safety factor applied, and concurrence from 
the ISS safety community [10]. 
 
The positive potential threshold was established based 
on a current threshold (derived from the possible 
positive FP of exposed conductive ISS surfaces, 
ionospheric density and temperature, and the possible 
EMU suit exposed conductive current collecting area) 
with collaboration/input from the ISS medical 
specialists on allowable current values [10]. 
 
To establish the probability (P1) of hazardous FP values 
on ISS, the historical database of FPMU measurements 
was reviewed and used to quantify the number of 
exceedances. These values were provided to the ISS 
Safety community for concurrence and the Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) team for input in their analyses.  
As these values provided a basis for the plasma hazard 
process, the ISS space environments team continues to 
monitor FPMU data for exceedances by reviewing the 
ISS floating potential, densities, and temperature 
measurements annually. 
 
Figure 1 shows a table listing the number of 
exceedances by year. The exceedances are shown for 
the truss tip (Tip), solar array rotary joint (SARJ), and 
centerline (Center) locations on the ISS truss. The 
fractional time of exceedances (exceedances compared 
to total measurement time) is used to establish the 
probability (P1) that is provided to the ISS PRA team. 
 
For the annual assessment review of the negative 
potential exceedances, the following process is utilized:  
(1) Calculate floating potential values at locations other 
than the FPMU install site using the Lorentz equation 
(VxB)∙L where L is the position vector relative to the 
FPMU of the point of interest, V is ISS velocity, and B 
is the value of the geomagnetic field at the point of the 
orbit). For the FPMU 128 hz (high time resolution) data 
we calculate FP at both truss tips (port and starboard), 
the solar array rotary joints (SARJs), and the vehicle 
center.  
(2) Scan the data for exceedances of the - 45.5 V safety 
threshold at either of the truss tips, SARJs, and vehicle 
center.  
(3) Record the data for the exceedances that meet the 
following criteria: (a) PCU off, (b) Exceed -45.5 V at 
either truss tip, either SARJ, or vehicle center. 
 
Total FPMU 
Measurement 
Time (sec)
Tip 
Exceedance 
(sec)
SARJ 
Exceedance 
(sec)
Center 
Exceedance 
(sec)
Year
2006 9.6E+03 0 0 0
2007 5.2E+04 0 0 0
2008 1.3E+06 111 38 18
2009 2.4E+06 221 26 1
2010 2.3E+06 37 24 23
2011 3.8E+06 49 36 34
2012 3.4E+06 50 44 44
2013 9.7E+06 136 130 130
2014 9.4E+06 115 112 108
2015 9.3E+06 162 107 105
2016 6.7E+06 184 117 103
2017 1.2E+07 708 371 229
2018 8.7E+06 609 296 149
Sum (sec) 6.9E+07 2383 1300 943
Fraction of exceedances: 1/ 1/ 1/
28818 52824 72792  
Figure 1. Annual FPMU Data Review for Exceedances 
 
For the annual review for positive potential 
exceedances, the following methodology is utilized to 
review for number of EVA hazard current exceedances, 
utilizing the current threshold and the following input 
parameters:  
 PCU “in discharge” (on), and not in discharge (off) 
FPMU data,  
 50 Ω EVA crew body resistance (based on thoracic 
impedance measurements during defibrillation of 
human patients.),  
 0.4 m2, and 0.1 m2 EMU current collection areas 
(those areas on the EMU large enough to collect 
hazardous levels of current)  
 
For those input parameters, the fraction of exceedances 
at both SARJ (inboard) and either Truss Tip were 
  
investigated for conservatism. (Note: it is likely the 
EVA would be performed on one side of the vehicle, 
not both sides). Values were found for exceedances for 
the limits of 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 25, and 35 mA. 
Exceedances are reviewed for Plasma Contactor Unit 
(PCU) both on and off, for locations including Truss 
Tip, and the Solar Array Rotary Joint (SARJ). 
 
The 5mA EVA hazard current threshold for the positive 
FP hazard is of particular concern. The 5 mA value was 
determined by reviewing the ISS Medical Operations 
team’s assessment of the physiological effects of 
different current levels. Medical operations determined 
that continuous direct current (DC) at 25 mA (or 
greater) could cause strong muscular contractions, 
possibly leading to bodily damage. Based on this data, 
the Safety team considered the severity of this level as 
catastrophic, due to possible bodily damage, and other 
events that could follow.  
 
Continuous DC in the range of 6 to 12 mA may 
generate some involuntary muscle movement. The 
Safety team also considered this event to be at the 
catastrophic severity level because involuntary 
movements during an EVA may create hazards. 
Continuous DC in the range of 2 to 12 mA may 
generate an involuntary startle response. While it is 
believed that the full range to 12 mA may be acceptable 
for inadvertent contact, since the effect does increase 
with increased current levels, for conservatism, it was 
determined to apply a hazard threshold of 5 mA. It 
should also be noted that these physiological effects are 
associated with continuous DC and that it is expected 
that the positive potential hazard will be intermittent and 
short duration.  
 
The annual review of the FPMU data is performed to 
validate that the exceedances remain in family with the 
values (P1) that were approved by the ISS Safety 
Review Panel (SRP) in connection with the acceptance 
of the detection and warning process. 
 
ISS floating potential is driven by electron temperature 
(Te), density (Ne), motional EMF, the ISS Electrical 
Power System (EPS) (solar array operations/regulation) 
operations, payload operations (in particular, induced 
current from payloads), visiting vehicles (in particular, 
those with higher voltage solar arrays), and (rarely) 
auroral charging.  
 
Te and Ne are important for spacecraft charging as they 
affect the current collected by the vehicle. The status of 
the ionospheric space weather, in particular solar 
activity/storms affects the density, in particular local 
density that can increase charging and currents. 
Motional EMF affects ISS charging because of the size 
of the ISS vehicle, in particular the length of the truss. 
For ISS, the two truss tips can be at very different 
potentials at high latitude, e..g, one positive, the other 
negative. So, one side of the vehicle can be collecting 
electrons, while the other collects ions. The space 
environments team includes the geomagnetic field and 
orbital location (latitude/longitude) and ISS flight 
attitude  when evaluating ISS charging. In addition to 
the natural environment factors discussed, vehicle 
operations may also effect the vehicle FP (i.e. solar 
array regulation induced charging). 
 
The ISS Space Environments team has identified, 
categorized, and actively tracks charging events in 
which the FP is more negative than -10V.. These 
charging events include: Auroral Charging, Eclipse 
Entry (EE) charging, Power on Reset (POR) charging, 
Regulation Event (RE), and Rapid Charging Event 
(RCE) charging. 
 
Auroral charging is driven by high energy particles 
accelerated along the magnetic field lines. Rapid 
Charging Event (RCE) charging is due to the 
displacement current of the plasma sheath. For these 
events, the plasma density is too low to support a 
current. Eclipse Entry (EE) charging are small charging 
events as ISS enters eclipse and originate by the same 
mechanism as RCE events. Power on Reset (POR) 
charging events are due to the charging of a small 
capacitance in series with the frame and sheath 
(possibly the cover glass or kapton film in the Solar 
Array). Regulation Event (RE) charging events 
originate by the same mechanism as POR events; 
however, RE’s also occur due to solar array operations.  
 
Figure 2 shows a time history of these extreme charging 
events broken out by event classification over the period 
spanning from 2006 through 2018. Examining Figure 2, 
it is clear that EE and Auroral charging are not-
dominant charging mechanisms. POR’s occurred 
frequently over the period spanning from 2014 through 
2016; however, Space Environments noted a rapid 
decrease in POR events following the Sequential Shunt 
Unit (SSU) Repair & Replace (R&R) EVA activity 
which occurred in January of 2016. RCE’s and RE’s are 
by far the most common charging mechanisms. 
 
While the ISS Space Environments team monitors these 
extreme charging events to maintain general awareness 
of the ISS plasma environment, all of these anomalous 
charging event categories have been determined to be 
negligible contributors to the EVA shock hazard. This is 
true because: a) the majority of the charging event 
categories are short in duration (on the order of 2-3 
seconds) relative to the time required for a shock hazard 
to persist (on the order of seconds or more, depending 
on potential). The exception to this are auroral charging 
events which can span several minutes. However, as 
  
Figure 2 shows, auroral charging events which exceed a 
FP of -10V are exceedingly rare. Secondly, b) for all of 
these charging event types, the majority of the FP is 
supported by the plasma sheath, not the dielectric 
material. The significance of this as it relates to the 
EVA shock hazard will be discussed later in this paper.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. FPMU Data Review: Time history of extreme 
charging events by type (late CY 2006 to Dec. 2018). 
Black X’s indicate an FP spike greater than 10V. Red 
rectangles indicate an FP spike greater than 40V. 
 
It should also be noted that for the survey of 
exceedances, as shown in Figure 2, all the exceedances 
are included (e.g., short duration, etc…), for 
conservatism, in the determination of the probability 
(P1) of hazardous values. While all exceedances are 
included, the short duration, intermittent charging 
processes add conservatism, however, their individual 
contribution to the P1 value is limited because of their 
short durations and infrequent occurrence.  
 
The ISS space environments team utilizes a spacecraft 
charging model of ISS, the Plasma Interaction Model 
(PIM), to estimate vehicle charging based on the 
ionospheric environment electron density and 
temperature from FPMU on-orbit measurements (for 
post-event comparisons), and the IRI (International 
Reference Ionosphere) model (for predictions) [13,14]. 
The output of the model is vehicle charging that is 
compared against the FPMU floating potential data. 
Figure 3 shows the FPMU measurements and PIM 
calculations on a 45 degree scatter plot at ISS on-orbit 
eclipse exit (when the vehicle translates from eclipse to 
insolation and the solar arrays become charged). Eclipse 
exit is expected to be when some of the highest solar 
array driven charging occurs. As can be observed, the 
model does not capture the events observed in the lower 
right of the plot. 
 
The events in the lower right quadrant of Figure 3 have 
been identified as rapid charging events (RCE), as 
discussed earlier. The FPMUmeasures the floating 
potential from the plasma, across the sheath, and across 
the dielectric to the vehicle structure. The plasma hazard 
risk is primarily driven by the potential across the 
dielectric, not the sheath. The potential across the sheath 
is discussed in Hartman, et. al., 2018. The ISS charging 
model (PIM) has been developed to calculate the 
potential across the dielectric, as that is the hazard, and 
to simplify the calculations required to model the 
potential over the ISS orbits. [13,14]  
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Figure 3. 45 Degree Scatter Plot Comparing FPMU 
Measurements and PIM Calculations at Eclipse Exit for 
all Ne (Scatter Plot @ FPMU location, PIM3.0, 
10/02/2017) 
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Figure 4. 45 Degree Scatter Plot Comparing FPMU 
Measurements and PIM Calculations at Eclipse Exit for 
Ne > 5E10 m-3 (Scatter Plot @ FPMU location, PIM3.0, 
10/02/2017, remove rapid events) 
 
  
Figure 4 is similar to Figure 3 and shows the FPMU 
measurements and PIM calculations on a 45 degree 
scatter plot at ISS on-orbit eclipse exit. For Figure 4, the 
rapid charging events have been removed from the plot. 
 
Note that the PIM model overall under prediction has 
also been primarily attributed to the potential being 
calculated across the dielectric, while the on-orbit 
measurements include the sheath [13]. Figure 5 shows a 
plot of the delta voltage across the anodized aluminum 
(blue) and the sheath (orange). As can be seen in the 
figure, the potential drop across the sheath can be 
significant. However, the EVA shock hazard is 
dependent upon the potential across the dielectric 
material only. Therefore, these extreme, short-duration 
charging events not captured by PIM contribute 
negligibly to the overall EVA shock hazard. 
 
 
Figure 5. Plot of the ΔV across the anodized aluminum 
(blue) and the sheath (orange) when solar array current 
is 50 mA for 1 second and the Ne is 1e10 m-3. (Figure 
as shown in Reference [13]) 
 
3. CRITERIA (2): EVENTS LEADING TO 
HAZARDOUS FP VALUES ON ISS CAN BE 
IDENTIFIED WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD-
TIME TO ENABLE ACTIVATION OF 
CONTROLS OR RESCHEDULING OF THE 
EVA 
A detection and warning approach was developed to 
support the ISS EVA Program shock hazard control 
process. The process is described in Figure 6, The 
Plasma Hazard Monitor and Notification Criteria and 
Process. 
 
For each EVA, the ISS Flight Operations Team submits 
a Short-Term Plasma Forecast Request document three 
weeks prior to an EVA.  At this time, the FPMU is 
activated for data gathering. This data is used daily to 
determine the present state of the environment and track 
any changes in the ionospheric environment and ISS FP 
value in the weeks leading up to the EVA. 
  
The ISS space environments team monitors for Coronal 
Mass Ejections (CME) and high-speed solar winds with 
Co-rotating Interaction Regions (CIRs) starting 2 weeks 
prior to a planned EVA. (For a contingency EVA within 
two weeks, the team starts monitoring for CMEs and 
CIRs at the time. a need for an EVA is identified.   
 
The ISS Space Environments team performed a study of 
the possible effects of space weather events/storms on 
ionospheric density, as those effects may affect ISS 
vehicle charging. Based on that study, it was determined 
that a CME may increase the ionospheric variability by 
approximately 2-sigma (variability) [15].   
 
 
Figure 6. Plasma Hazard Monitor and Notification 
Criteria and Process 
 
To account for the effect of possible space weather 
events/conditions that have been found to increase P1 
such as solar storms (CMEs, coronal holes) and high-
speed solar wind, the Plasma Interaction Model (PIM) is 
run for a Ne enhancement of a factor of 6 for CMEs and 
a factor of 2 for high speed solar winds to calculate 
possible space weather effects on the vehicle and 
crewmember during the EVA. If the Floating Potential 
does not break the -45.5 V requirement and the DC 
current does not exceed 5 mA then a space weather 
event is not a concern and will not affect the EVA.  If 
these thresholds are broken then further monitoring of 
CME and solar wind speeds on a daily basis prior to 
EVA is required, and the ISS Program is notified (via 
the Vehicle Integrated Performance and Resources 
(VIPER) console in the Mission Control Center (MCC) 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER)), as soon as the event 
is identified to adjust the ISS hazard controls 
accordingly.  
 
An initial forecast is provided to the Flight Control 
Team approximately 2 weeks prior to the start of the 
  
EVA. The forecast includes an assessment for the EVA 
location (inboard, outboard), for the present plasma 
environment (based on FPMU data), and for the planned 
EVA solar array plan. Loss of Attitude Control 
(LOAC), is also considered.  
 
The final forecast is provided at 24 hours prior to the 
start of the EVA. If there is a prediction of exceedances, 
the ISS Flight Control Team Console notifies the ISS 
Program of a Significant Plasma Hazard Space Weather 
Event.  
 
The ISS PRA team and Space Environments team also 
reviewed the probability of a space weather event 
occurring on an EVA day to confirm that it would not 
occur so often as to be unmanageable. The ISS Space 
Environments team provided the PRA team with the 
expected number of space weather days of concern per 
year (~7). With the number of EVA days per year (~10 
EVA days/yr), the ISS PRA team estimated that there 
may be 1 space weather event of concern every 6 years 
occurring on an EVA day that may require the ISS 
Program to review and make a determination. 
 
4. CRITERIA (3): PROBABILITY (P2) OF 
COMPLETING THE EVA CREW-HAZARD 
SHOCK-CIRCUIT DURING ANY EVA IS 
LOW 
The ISS PRA team performed an assessment to 
determine the probability of completing the EVA crew-
hazard shock-circuit during EVA. To support this 
assessment the ISS PRA, space environments, safety, 
medical, and VIPER teams met to review EMU electric 
shock circuit pathways and galvanic contact 
probabilities that had been determined previously by 
specialists. Figure 7 shows the identified external EMU 
surfaces reviewed. 
 
Based on that meeting the ISS PRA team agreed to 
obtain and review surveys of video records of galvanic 
contact between the EVA crew metallic suit parts and 
ISS conducting structure elements. The video survey 
were provided by the suit manufacturer, Hamilton-
Sundstrand. 
 
This survey provided the basis for the probability of 
completing the circuit. An assumption was also made, 
based on human factors, that a galvanic contact on the 
exterior of the EMU was likely to also result in a 
simultaneous electrical contact with bare metal on the 
inside of the EMU.. The ISS PRA team also considered 
suit modifications, and operational procedures that had 
been implemented to mitigate the concern. In particular, 
the ISS Program implemented EVA tool modifications 
(electrical isolation of the tool caddy) to lower the 
exposed conducting area.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. External EMU Surfaces 
 
 
For conservatism the contact probability is used for both 
cases, the negative ISS FP and positive ISS FP hazards. 
Both hazards are classified as catastrophic hazards. The 
control points for both hazards was discussed previously 
in this paper. 
 
To perform the PRA assessment, a discrete event 
simulation was developed to model EVA plasma shock 
events.  Fault trees, a more traditional PRA modelling 
methodology, capture the probability of events 
occurring over time but not when they occur.  In this 
case it was important to model not only the rate at 
which contacts occur but also their duration and time of 
occurrence.  For an indirect continuity path to occur, 
multiple events that occur intermittently over a given 
time span must align (e.g. safety tether body contacts 
wrist bearing while also in contact with ISS structure, 
while safety tether wire is in contact with EMU). 
 
A discrete event simulation models the operation of a 
system as a discrete sequence of events occurring at 
particular points in time.  This simulation sampled 
contact times and durations for each indirect continuity 
path (for each crewmember), and then compared those 
samples to check for overlap.  
 
Figure 9 shows a representation for the probability (P2) 
of completing the hazard circuit/contact. The figure 
shows the results for mean (1/290), 5th percentile, and 
the 95th percentile. 
 
  
 
Figure 8. Discrete Event Simulation Logic 
 
 
Figure 9. Probability of Completing the Hazard 
Circuit/Contact (P2) 
 
 
 
5.  CRITERIA (4): NET PROBABILITY OF AN 
EVA CREW SHOCK EVENT, Ps IS SMALL 
ENOUGH FOR THE PROGRAM TO ACCEPT 
THE RESIDUAL RISK WHEN EVA IS 
CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACTIVE HAZARD 
CONTROLS 
 
 
5.1. Ps = F(P1,P2) SPACE WEATHER AND THE 
DETECTION AND WARNING PRODUCT 
Once the likelihood of contact was established, the 
hazardous scenarios were constructed and their 
probabilities calculated.  
 
In the case of EV crew hazardous exposure to shock due 
to negative potential, the crewmember must be at a 
location on the ISS truss with a negative floating 
potential, and the EMU must make electrical contact 
with ISS (either directly or indirectly). As stated earlier, 
crew electrical contact with the EMU interior is 
assumed. Achieving these two events simultaneously 
results in the EV crewmember becoming a ground to 
space for whatever charge has accrued on the ISS 
dielectric surfaces. Combining the likelihood of a 
negative floating potential in excess of `45.5 V (as 
described in Figure 1) with the likelihood of galvanic 
contact (as described by P2 (Criteria 3)) results in a 
probability of hazard occurrence of less than 1E-7 for an 
8-hour EVA. 
 
As stated earlier in the discussion of P1, EV crew 
hazardous exposure to shock due to positive potential 
was given a threshold 5 mA. In order for the electrical 
circuit to be completed, several events must occur 
simultaneously. As with negative potential, the 
crewmember must be at a location on the ISS truss with 
a positive floating potential, and the EMU must make 
electrical contact with ISS (either directly or indirectly), 
resulting in simultaneous electrical contact between the 
crew and the EMU interior (assumed). In addition, the 
exposed bare metal of the EMU must be collecting 
charge from the ionosphere, and the overall circuit 
impedance must be low enough to allow a harmful 
current level (i.e. 5 mA). Conditions worsen if the safety 
tether housing has also been collecting charge and 
makes non-grounding contact with the EMU during 
contact with ISS.  
 
It is assumed that the non-grounded exposed bare metal 
of the EMU will be collecting charge from the 
ionosphere (as will the crew member’s safety tether 
housing). What remains is the likelihood that the crew 
member makes direct or indirect (via a tool) contact 
with the positively charged ISS, possibly while in 
contact with the additionally charged tether housing, 
thus discharging the various EMU and housing surfaces 
through the crew member’s body to the ISS structure. 
Combining the likelihood of an environment capable of 
creating a 5 mA exceedance (as described by P1 
(criteria 1), varied by distance from the ISS truss 
centerline) with the likelihood of galvanic contact (as 
described by P2 (Criteria 3)) results in a Ps that is also 
varied by distance from the ISS truss centreline. With 
the PCUs off, the mean likelihood of EV crew exposure 
to this positive potential hazard is 1 in 34,000,000 
inboard of the SARJ; 1 in 11,000,000 outboard of the 
SARJ; and 1 in 290,000 at the truss tip, for an 8 hour 
EVA.  
 
Note that this is considered a conservative assessment, 
given that only part of the EVA would be conducted 
outboard of the SARJ and EVAs are nominally planned 
for approximately 6.5 hours in total duration. Also, note 
that the mean likelihood for all locations with PCUs on 
is worse (greater), since PCUs were not designed to 
control or mitigate a positive potential hazard. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show the results of the assessment for 
two locations, at the ISS truss Tip and 35 m from the 
vehicle centreline, with the PCU off. The results for the 
positive shock hazard are shown with the green boxes. 
Results are shown for multiple current levels. For the 
ISS Program, the 5 mA threshold has been selected, and 
  
is indicated with the red arrow. The results for the 
negative shock hazard are shown at the bottom of the 
figure with the blue box. For reference only, the overall 
EVA Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for the crew is shown 
with the red box. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Probability of Positive Shock (8 hour EVA, 2 
crew) (Truss Tip, PCU Off) 
 
 
Figure 11. Probability of Positive Shock (8 hour EVA, 2 
crew) (35 m from Vehicle Centerline, PCU Off) 
 
 
 
The results of this assessment for the net probability of 
an EVA crew shock event (Ps) and the detection and 
warning process has been presented to and accepted by 
the ISS Program, and the safety community, and 
supports the decision for EVA on ISS without active 
hazard controls. 
 
5.2. HOW DOES THE ISS PROGRAM MANAGE 
THE EVA SHOCK HAZARD WHEN Ps IS 
UNACCEPTABLY LARGE? 
In the event of exceedances and high Ps, the ISS 
Program has hazard control options available. For EVAs 
inboard of the SARJ (without the positive potential 
hazard), in the event of a significant space weather 
event, the two PCUs can be placed in discharge. This 
option is only single-fault-tolerant for the negative 
potential hazard and doesn’t control +V                                           
EVA hazard (this hazard has been found to be minimal 
and acceptable for inboard the SARJ) but for little or no 
added operational risk. 
 
For EVA outboard of the SARJ, if there is a high value 
of Ps, in the event of a significant space whether event, 
the ISS Program maintains the option to defer the EVA 
until the event passes.  
 
 
6. RISK TRADE DISCUSSION – TWO-FAULT-
TOLERANT HAZARD CONTROL SYSTEM 
AT ALL TIMES VS. DETECTION AND 
WARNING APPROACH 
The ISS safety process requires that catastrophic 
hazards are two fault tolerant controlled, so that two 
faults can occur, and the hazard would still remain 
controlled.  
 
 
The ISS Program has two PCUs on the vehicle that can 
be utilized to control the FP (floating potential). 
However, the two ISS PCUs are only single fault 
tolerant so a third operational hazard control is needed 
to meet the safety requirements for catastrophic hazards. 
 
Options for providing a third hazard control have been 
investigated in the past. These included: wake pointing 
of photovoltaic (PV) arrays, EPS management 
(shunting/ regulation) of the solar arrays, and changing 
the vehicle attitude (with the truss long axis parallel to 
the velocity vector). Each of these options introduces 
additional operational risk, and/or planning complexity. 
Wake pointing arrays reduces available power for 
operations and planning, as does solar array 
shunting/regulation. Changing the vehicle attitude 
requires approval/certification for the attitude and 
operational planning. In addition, controls for the 
negative potential hazard do not solve the positive 
potential hazard. Therefore,  risk acceptance is still 
needed in the case of  motional EMF +V hazards. 
 
The detection and warning approach requires no active 
hazard controls when Ps is small enough, which has 
been the case most of the time during the past several 
years. Therefore, conditions leading to increased Ps are 
  
detected before the EVA and conventional hazard 
controls can be activated as needed, minimizing EVA 
risk. In addition, not implementing EVA shock hazard 
controls when the hazard is absent eliminated difficult 
to quantify operational risk. 
 
6.1. VALIDATION AND ISS PROGRAMMATIC 
APPROVAL OF THE DETECTION AND 
WARNING APPROACH TO EVA SHOCK 
HAZARD CONTROL 
The detection and warning approach was approved 
through the ISS Program acceptance process that 
included team level technical specialist, Program Office 
technical forum, safety panel, and ISS Program board 
approvals. 
 
Considerations with the approval included the 
possibility of the loss of the on-orbit FPMU data 
availability. The FPMU data ensures that the vehicle is 
still operated within the expected floating potential 
values. A study was performed to develop a backup 
procedure for collecting ionosphere data in the event of 
the loss of FPMU data to produce the plasma hazard 
forecast.  
 
IRI Real-Time Assimilative Mapping (IRTAM) was 
selected as a viable alternative data source. IRTAM is 
an ionospheric model that uses real time measurements 
from ~70 digisonde instruments that provide continuous 
near real time measurements of key ionospheric 
parameters. It is used in the same manner as FPMU data 
in conjunction with International Reference Ionosphere 
(IRI) model to provide Ne and Te values to produce the 
forecast. The Space Environments team worked with 
University of Massachusetts at Lowell (UML) Space 
Science Lab to obtain access to the IRTAM data to 
support the back-up methodology, to be used in the case 
of FPMU failure in the days leading up to an EVA. [15] 
 
7. THE APPLICABILITY OF PROBABILISTIC 
SPACECRAFT CHARGING HAZARD 
ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL METHODS 
TO HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT BEYOND LEO 
The ISS Space Environments team has developed an 
EVA Shock Hazard Detection and Warning Process that 
meets the criteria for acceptance by the ISS Program, as 
discussed in this paper. The general approach does have 
applicability to future human spaceflight missions as 
risk trades will need to be performed to support mission 
success. The approach allowed the on-orbit FP (floating 
potential) and ionospheric measurements to be compiled 
into input data that the PRA team could then use to 
generate the probabilistic spacecraft charging data 
required by the ISS Program management to support 
their decisions. 
 
For future missions, the spacecraft charging risks will 
be different. In the case of the cis-lunar environment, 
the vehicle-charging environment will include higher 
electron temperatures, with a greater contribution from 
secondary electron and photo-electron emission.  
 
For missions that pass through the Van Allen Belt, 
GEO, and Geo tail environments, the vehicles will be 
subjected to much higher electron energies for the 
duration of the transit (5, 12, 16-12).  The geo tail 
spacecraft-charging environment is similar to but less 
severe than the GEO environment. Earth’s moon resides 
in the Geo tail environment whenever the moon is near 
full as viewed from earth (21-23). Solar energetic 
particle events can also produce spacecraft charging 
environments in cis-lunar space (24) 
 
Designing spacecraft specifically for the more severe 
charging environments beyond LEO will be the best 
approach. However, when the material selection does 
not support that approach, spacecraft charging 
assessments and hazard analysis will be required. Those 
charging assessments will need to consider the 
requirements, and possible approaches to quantify the 
data that can support the Program’s risk trade decisions. 
The frequency of occurrence and severity of expected 
charging environments will need to be quantified to 
determine whether or not a detection and warning 
approach to managing spacecraft charging hazards will 
be acceptable in cis-lunar space beyond LEO.  
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